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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-20 SAM-01 SP-03 INR-11 PM-07 CIAE-00

NSC-07 RSC-01 DRC-01 /077 W

----- 092441

P 101900Z SEP 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7468

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 4369

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NY PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

USLOSACLANT PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4873

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, GR

SUBJECT: GREECE AND NATO

REF: A. STATE 191420 B. STAE 192442 C. USNATO 4845

D. STATE 198059

SUMMARY: PURSUANT TO DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS IN REFERENCES A AND B, MISSION REPORTS HERewith ON INFORMAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS DURING THE PAST WEEK WITH SELECTED ALLIES ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GREEK ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD AHS ALSO INFORMED SYG LUNS OF THE U.S. APPROACH. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALLIED DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN AT THE SPC LEVEL. IN GENERAL, ALL ALLIES CONTACTED WELCOMED THE U.S. INITIATIVE AND CONCURRED IN THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIAL AND INFORMAL BILATERAL CONTACTS

AIMED AT DEVELOPING A COMMON APPROACH. ALL RECOGNIZED THAT AT SOME POINT, HOWEVER, THERE WOULD BE NEED TO ESTABLISH SOME
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FORMAL MECHANISMS FOR DEALING WITH THE MATTER AND FOR INCLUDING ADDITIONAL ALLIES IN THE DISCUSSIONS. ALLIES ALSO FELT THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SOME COMMON NATO APPRECIATIONS THAT EACH GOVERNMENT COULD DRAW UPON IN RESPONDING TO THE KARAMANLIS LETTER.

THEY ALL RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THE NEED FOR EACH ALLY TO RESPOND SEPARATELY AND TO REFLECT THE INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS. THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED THAT BONN WAS INTENDING TO REPLY TO THE KARAMANLIS LETTER WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS FOLLOWING THE MAVROS VISIT. YESTERDAY (SEPTEMBER 9) SYG LUNS CONVENED THE CYPRUS GROUP TO DISCUSS ALLIED REPLIES TO THE KARAMANLIS LETTER WHICH WAS REPORTED IN REF C. END SUMMARY

COMMENTS OF THE ALLIED DELEGATIONS FOLLOW:

1. NETHERLANDS DCM BUWALDA REACTED SAYING U.S. ANALYSIS AND INITIATIVE "MEETS WITH OUR COMPLETE APPROVAL." HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S. INITIATIVE AND SAID THAT WHILE HIS AUTHORITIES AGREE ON A VERY LOW OFFICIAL PROFILE, THEY ALSO FEEL SOME UNOFFICIAL STUDY AND PLANNING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE SHOULD PROCEED. HE RECALLED THE RECENT VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER STOEL TO ATHENS AND SAID DUTCH OVERWHELMING IMPRESSION WAS THAT GREEK TENSIONS AND PASSIONS ARE HIGH.

2. BUWALDA ADDED THAT THE HAGUE FEARS EVEN WITH PASSIONS CALMED DOWN MR. KARAMANLIS WILL--DESPITE HIS OWN PREFERENCES--BE POLITICALLY UNABLE TO GO BACK ON THE DECISION WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN.

3. NOT SURPRISINGLY, MR. BUWALDA WAS THOROUGHLY INFORMED OF THE COMPOSITION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE CYPRUS GROUP. HE WAS BLUNT IN SAYING THAT THE GREEK WITHDRAWAL PROBLEM IS THE KIND OF QUESTION ON WHICH FRANCE SIMPLY CANNOT ACT FOR THE NINE AND CANNOT REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS. HE ADDED HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT WOULD BE RATHER SURPRISING IF FRANCE WERE INCLUDED IN ANY COORDINATION OF ALLIES' REACTION TO THE GREEK MILITARY WITHDRAWAL. PROTESTING HE DIDN'T WANT TO BE QUOTED, BUWALDA WENT ON TO SAY THAT FRANCE NOT ONLY WOULD BE OF NO HELP WHATSOEVER, BUT IN HIS OPINION FRANCE WOULD BE A HINDRANCE BECAUSE PARIS SEEMS TO BE ENCOURAGING GREECE TO QUIT THE MILITARY STRUCTURE.

4. CONCERNING RESPONSE TO THE KARAMANLIS LETTER, BUWALDA SAID
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THE SCANDINAVIANS HAVE TAKEN AN INITIATIVE TOWARD COORDINATING RESPONSES. HE SAID NORWEGIAN CHARGE SELMER THOUGHT RESPONSES TO ATHENS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BUT "NOT HARMONIZED." BUWALDA DID NOT AGREE WITH SELMER AND SAID ALLIES COULD AGREE TO COORDINATE RESPONSES ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINE: ALLIES SHOULD EXPRESS REGRET AND HOPE THAT THE DECISION WILL BE REVERSED, AND SHOULD POINT OUT THE DANGERS TO THE SECURITY NOT ONLY OF THE ALLIES BUT THE DANGERS TO GREECE HERSELF.

5. BUWALDA THOUGHT THE REFERENCE TO DANGERS SHOULD INCLUDE A REMARK ABOUT THE DANGER TO GREECE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY RECOMMENDED TO THE HAGUE INCLUSION OF WORDS SUCH AS "GREECE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH

WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS WILL NOT BE HELPED." BUT HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BUY THIS LANGUAGE.

6. ITALY: CHARGE SPINELLI EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AND SENSE OF RELIEF AT U.S. REPRESENTATION. HE HAD JUST BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ROME AND SAID THAT HIS AUTHORITIES FRANKLY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE "APATHY" OF NATO. THEY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF PREPARING AN ITALIAN INITIATIVE ON THE SUBJECT WHICH PERMREP CATALANO WOULD BRING BACK WITH HIM WHEN HE RETURNS FROM ROME. THEY WERE PLANNING TO VENTILATE IT AT THE PERMREP'S LUNCH ON TUESDAY (SEPTEMBER 10) AND ACCORDING TO THE PLAN CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE DPC SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

7. SPINELLI COVERED PREDICTABLE GROUND ABOUT HOW ITALY IS THE MOST CONCERNED AND AFFECTED OF ALL THE ALLIES BY THIS GREEK MOVE AND SAID FACT THAT NOTHING SEEMS TO BE HAPPENING IN NATO CAN BE MISJUDGED BY ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION.

8. IN RESPONSE TO OUR INQUIRY ABOUT ITALIAN PLANS TO RESPOND TO THE KARAMANLIS LETTER, SPINELLI SAID FOR THE MOMENT NOTHING HAS HAPPENED BECAUSE MR. RUMOR IS NOT IN ROME.

9. CONCERNING OUR LIST OF DISSIMILARITIES TO FRENCH WITHDRAWAL, ON A PERSONAL BASIS HE RECALLED A NUMBER OF POSITIONS FRANCE HAS FOUND ITSELF OBLIGED TO TAKE SINCE 1967 SIMPLY TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE REASONING GIVEN AT THE TIME SHE WITHDREW FROM THE NATO INTEGRATED STRUCTURE, E.G. NON-PARTICIPATION IN MBFR AND THE SECRET

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EUROGROUP. SPINELLI THOUGHT ONE THING THAT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT TO THE GREEKS AS AN EXAMPLE HOW THEIR SITUATION IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF FRANCE IS THAT FOR THEM IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF NOT JOINING IN THESE ACTIVITIES BUT RATHER OF WITHDRAWING THEMSELVES FROM THEM. NOTING THAT MBFR IS IN THEORY A NEGOTIATION AMONG SOVEREIGN STATES AND NOT ONE BETWEEN BLOCS, SPINELLI ASKED REHETORICALLY, WILL GREECE NOW CEASE PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE OF VIENNA?

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-20 SAM-01 SP-03 INR-11 PM-07 CIAE-00

NSC-07 RSC-01 DRC-01 /077 W
----- 092447

P 101900Z SEP 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7469
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 4370
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NY PRIORITY
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10. SPINELLI SAID THAT ROME'S POSITION IS IN FAVOR OF ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH GREECE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THEREFORE, AS COROLLARY FO THIS, ROME FAVORED COORDINATION AMONG THE ALLIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF THE SORT THAT WAS BEGUN BY OUR MEETING.

11. FRG ACTING POLAD HOYNCK INDICATED THAT OUR REPRESENTATION WAS PARTICULARLY TIMELY AS BONN IS IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A COURSE OF ACTION AT THIS TIME. GREEK FONMIN MAVROS WILL BE IN BONN ON SEPTEMBER 9 AND 10, AND HOYNCK EXPECTS THAT SHORTLY AFTER THE MAVROS VISIT THE CHANCELLOR WILL SEND AN ANSWER TO THE KARAMANLIS LETTER.

12. HOYNCK SAID HIS GOVERNMENT SHARES THE VIEW THAT GREECE SHOULD NOT BE PRESSED AT THIS TIME. BECAUSE OF THE NATI-NATO FEELING CURRENTLY SO STRONG AMONG THE GREEKS, BONN FEELS THAT TIME IS NECESSARY TO ALLOW PASSIONS TO COOL. BONN ANALYSTS RETAIN THE HOPE THAT GREEK THINKING WILL COME BACK TO NORMAL, THUS ENABLING LEADERS TO REALIZE THE DANGERS TO GREEK SECURITY OF THE STEPS THEY ARE TAKING. THEY RECOGNIZE HOWEVER THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF
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THE POSITION BEING REVERSED IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF GREEK PUBLIC OPINION.

13. HOYNCK SAID HIS AUTHORITIES FEEL THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO KARAMANLIS IS TO SAY THAT THE ALLIANCE IS STUDYING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MOVE WHICH ATHENS HAS ANNOUNCED. HE THOUGHT THAT WHILE THE ALLIES SHOULD MOVE SLOWLY AND DELIBERATELY, LEAVING THE INITIATIVE TO ATHENS, THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE DELAY OUR OWN STUDY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE GREEK ACTION. REGARDING THE FORUM FOR COORDINATION, HOYNCK SAID HIS PEOPLE FEEL THAT FOR THE TIME BEING BILATERAL CONTACTS ARE APPROPRIATE.

14. ON A PERSONAL BASIS, HOYNCH RECOGNIZED THE INEFFICIENCY OF BILATERAL CONTACTS AMONG SO MANY AND SUGGESTED PERHAPS ALLIES COULD AGREE ON A "CLEARING POINT" AT SOME "WELL-STAFFED DELEGATION LIKE THE U.S. OR UK." WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WAS A PERSON WHO COULD ACT

AS POINT OF CONTACT WHICH WOULD MEAN THAT EACH DELEGATION NEED HAVE ONLY ONE BILATERAL.

15. THE GERMAN DIPLOMAT REMARKED THAT THE GREEKS ARE VERY DISAPPOINTED AT HOW LITTLE VISIBLE OR AUDIBLE REACTION ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES THEY HAVE THUS FAR CAUSED WITH THEIR WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT. HE THOUGHT ALLIES SHOULD BEGIN TO CONSIDER WHETHER A COMPLETELY PASSIVE ROLE CONTINUES TO BE ADVISABLE. HIS FEAR WAS THAT THIS WOULD ENCOURAGE ANTI-NATO ELEMENTS IN ATHENS TO PRESS FOR SEVERANCE OF FURTHER TIES UNTIL A SATISFACTORY EXPRESSION OF PAIN IS RECEIVED IN RETURN. HOYNCK WAS CLEARLY THINKING ALONG THE LINES OF PERHAPS COORDINATING AND EXPRESSING SOME MEASURED EXPRESSION OF DISTRESS, ANGUISH OR DIMAY SO THE GREEK LEFT MIGHT FEEL THAT THEY HAVE STRUCK A SATISFACTORY BLOW. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION, HE REPLIED CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO COORDINATION WITHIN THE NINE OF REACTION TO GREEK MILITARY WITHDRAWAL OR TO THE KARAMANLIS LETTER.

16. BELGIUM DCM BAL WELCOMED U.S. INITIATIVE AND GENERALLY AGREED WITH THE U.S. APPROACH. HE INDICATED THAT AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE AND THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY WERE GIVING A LOT OF THOUGHT TO THE PROBLEM AND THAT THE U.S. VIEWS WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO THEM. HE PROMISED TO CONTACT U.S. MISSION AFTER HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH DE STAERCKE.

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17. FRANCE DCM CARRAUD WELCOMED BEING INFORMED OF U.S. THINKING, BUT NOTED THAT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS FRANCE COULD NOT TAKE PART IN ANY FORMAL GROUP DEALING WITH GREEK WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR THE ALLIANCE AND SAID FRANCE WOULD TRY TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE. HE DID ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR SOME SORT OF NATO ASSESSMENT OF CONSEQUENCES OF GREEK WITHDRAWAL.

18. UK POLAD MARGETSON HAD JUST JOINED THE BRITISH DELEGATION AND WAS UNABLE TO GIVE ANY OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE U.S. APPROACH, ALTHOUGH IN GENERAL, HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT IT WAS THE RIGHT WAY TO PROCEED. HE PROMISED TO PURSUE THE MATTER WITH AMBASSADOR PECK AS SOON AS THE UK PERMREP RETURNED.

19. MISSION COMMENT: U.S. DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE INFORMAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE GREEK WITHDRAWAL. THE INFORMAL MEETING OF THE THIRTEEN ALLIES SCHEDULED FOR TODAY (SEPTEMBER 10) (REFERENCES C AND D) TO DISCUSS REPLIES TO THE KARAMANLIS LETTER WILL PROVIDE A NATO FORUM FOR THAT PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE GREEK SITUATION. SUCH A GROUP, HOWEVER, MAY NOT BE BEST FOR DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE POSSIBLE GREEK WITHDRAWAL SINCE IT CONTAINS FRANCE. THE MISSION WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS WITH APPROPRIATE ALLIES THE MOST SUITABLE FORUM SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH SOME MORE FORMAL MECHANISM FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

RUMSFELD

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 SEP 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO04873
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740988/abbryxah.tel
Line Count: 275
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. STATE 191420 B. STAE 192442 C. USNATO 4845 D. STATE 198059
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <20 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: GREECE AND NATO
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, GR
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
GENEVA
USUN NY
USCINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH
NICOSIA

PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005